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Interest Arbitration and the NLRB:
A Case for the Self-Terminating
Interest Arbitration Clause
To avoid disruption caused by strikes and lockouts, unions and man-
agements may agree to arbitrate disputes that arise in negotiation of
collective bargaining agreements.' Despite a historical reluctance to
arbitrate these "interest" disputes," support for this type of arbitra-
tion seems to be growing.3 Pressed to minimize production costs by
1. For general discussions of this type of arbitration, see ARBITRATION OF INTEREST
DISPUTES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWVENTY-SIXTH ANNUAL MIELTI.NG, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
ARBITRTORS 1-61 (B. Dennis & G. Somers eds. 1974); Cushman, Voluntary Arbitration of
New Contract Terms-A Forum in Search of a Dispute, 16 LAB. L.J. 765 (1965); Morris,
The Role of Interest Arbitration in a Collective Bargaining System. 1 INDUS. REL. L.J. 427
(1976); Young, Arbitration of Terms for New Labor Contracts, 17 AV. REs. L. REv. 1302
(1966); Note, Quasi-Legislative Arbitration Agreements, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 109 (1964);
Note, Arbitration of Disputes Over New Labor Contract Terms, 15 V. REs. L. REv. 735
(1964).
The parties may agree beforehand to engage in arbitration of disputes that arise in
negotiation of their collective bargaining agreement, or they may agree on an ad hoc
basis when the disputes actually arise. Stevens, The Analytics of Voluntary Arbitration:
Contract Disputes, 7 INDUS. REL. 68, 69-70 (1967).
2. Arbitration of disputes that arise in negotiation of collective bargaining agreements
is referred to in the literature as "interest," "contract," "quasi-legislative," or "termina-
tion" arbitration. The usage "interest" arbitration will be employed here.
Interest arbitration may best be understood in terms of the distinction between dis-
putes of "interest" and disputes of "right":
[Intergroup conflicts] may originate in complaints about an alleged violation of
agreed standards by members of the opposite group, in differences regarding the
meaning or interpretation of those standards, [or] in the application of those stan-
dards to concrete cases . . . . This kind of dispute may be called . . . a 'conflict of
rights.' . . . Alternatively the conflict may be concerned with the variation of exist-
ing or the laying down of new standards, i.e. it may be a 'conflict of interests' . . . .
[The] distinction [is] between the protection of existing norms and the making of
IICi Ones ....
Kahn-Freund, Intergroup Conflicts and their Settlement, 5 BRIT. J. Soc. 193, 205 (1954).
Interest arbitration is designed to treat disputes of interest, while grievance arbitration
is designed to treat disputes of right.
3. In the early part of this centu-y interest arbitration was more common than
grievance arbitration, which involves disputes over conflicting interpretations of the
collective bargaining agreement. Grievance arbitration did not grow in importance until
the 1930s, when written collective bargaining agreements became more common. See
R. FLEMING, THE LABOR ARBITRATION PROCESS 12-14 (1965); Stieber, Voluntary Arbitration
of Contract Terms, in ARBITRATION AND THE EXPANDING ROLE OF NEUTRALS, PROCEEDINGS
OF THE TWENTY-THIRD ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 71, 71-77
(G. Somers & B. Dennis eds. 1970).
Support for interest arbitration declined after World War II. First, the postwar
tendency toward longer contract periods reduced the opportunities' for contract disputes
and hence for interest arbitration. Second, the replacement of reopening clauses on
wages with automatic adjustments such as cost-of-living escalators also reduced the need
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a competitive economic climate 4 and perhaps encouraged by the use
of interest arbitration in the public sector,a some parties have chosen to
adopt interest arbitration clauses in their collective bargaining agree-
for arbitration of wage disputes. Third, contract issues became increasingly complex.
Pension plans, for example, unlike an issue such as wages, involve long-term cost com-
mitments that parties are reluctant to have arbitrators make on their behalf. Finally,
both unions and managements, through devices such as strike funds and strike insurance,
have taken steps to protect themselves against the impact of strikes. Stiebcr, supra at
77-83. See also R. FLEMING, supra at 19-21.
Also contributing to the decline of interest arbitration may have been its lack of
adjudicatory standards. Parties fear that the arbitrator will merely "split the difference"
between their last offers, thus discouraging any serious attempt at reaching a prearbitral
settlement. Unlike grievance arbitration, no contract guides the arbitrator's decision.
See 2 Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act: Hearing5 Before the House
Comm. on Education and Labor, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 225 (1947) (statement of Dr. Harold
Metz, Brookings Institution) (absence of adjudicatory standards argues against com-
pulsory interest arbitration). See also Hines, Mandatory Contract Arbitration-Is It a
Viable Process?, 25 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 533, 544 (1972) (public sector interest arbitra-
tion experience in Canada indicates that absence of consistently employed standards is
major fault of system). But see Handsaker, Arbitration and Contract Disputes, in
CHALLENGES TO ARBITRATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 78, 84-90 (J. McKelvey ed. 1960) (suggesting ways to improve
interest arbitration to meet parties' criticisms and arguing that despite deficiencies in-
terest arbitration often better alternative than strikes or lockouts).
The result of these trends is that, in 1966, fewer than two percent of major collective
bargaining agreements had clauses providing for interest arbitration of new contract
terms, while 94% had grievance arbitration clauses. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
DEP'T OF LABOR, MAJOR COLLECTIVE BARGUINING AGREEMENTS ARBITRATION PROCEDURES 6-7,
96-97 (Bull. No. 1425-6, 1966). A recent survey, however, found that 41.5% of management
respondents and 63.8% of union respondents were willing to consider interest arbitration,
and that 31% of management respondents and 37% of union respondents were willing
to consider specifically interest arbitration by prior agreement. Stieber, supra at 95-97.
Both management and union respondents expressed reservations about the range of
issues that should be arbitrated. Id. at 102, 106.
4. See Fleming, "Interest" Arbitration Revisited, 7 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1, 3 (1973)
(erosion of American economic dominance in world market). For further explanation of
why parties turn to interest arbitration, see Stieber, supra note 3, at 119-21.
5. See Aksen, The Impetus to Contract Arbitration in the Public Area, in PROCEEDINGS
OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY TWENTY-FOURTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 103 (1972).
The use of interest arbitration in the public sector is in part the product of legisla-
tion. See McAvoy, Binding Arbitration of Contract Terms: A New Approach to the
Resolution of Disputes in the Public Sector, 72 COLUm. L. Rev. 1192, 1192-1205 (1972)
(describing statutory enactments requiring public sector interest arbitration at state and
local levels). Certain peculiar features of the public sector may preclude any simple
extrapolation to the private sector of the experience with interest arbitration in disputes
between the government and public employees. First, the longstanding national policy
of encouraging collective bargaining and of permitting strikes and lockouts in the
private sector stands in contrast to attitudes toward labor relations in the public sector,
where there has been public and governmental antipathy toward collective bargaining
and the use of concerted force by public employees. Interest arbitration may thus be a
more favored response to bargaining impasse in the public sector than in the private
sector. See generally H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES 29-32,
43-45, 49-51, 59-65 (1971) (arguing against ftll utilization of private sector bargaining
practices in public sector). Second, the bargaining- process in the public sector, unlike
that in the private sector, is integrally involved with political decisionmaking. Manage-
ment negotiators in the public sector often do not know what resources are going to be
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ments.6 Such clauses provide for arbitration of disputed issues arising
in negotiation of the succeeding agreement.
Recent decisions of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
threaten to impede the movement toward interest arbitration.7 The
Board's decisions, by declaring the interest arbitration clause a non-
mandatory subject of bargaining," have made it an unfair labor prac-
available to the governmental unit. The strike sanction levied in response to proposals
put forward by these negotiators incurs tile risk of not influencing (and possibly
alienating) those political decisionmakers who actually control the governmental unit's
appropriations. For this additional reason, interest arbitration may have a more favored
role as a substitute for strikes in the public than in the private sector. See Summers,
Public Sector Bargaining: Problems of Governmental Decisionmaking, 44 U. CIN. L.
REv. 669, 670 (1975) (greater concern in public sector than in private sector with decision-
making process leading to employer's bargaining position); Summers, Public Employee
Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 YALE L.J. 1156, 1156 (1974) ("[I]n private employ-
ment collective bargaining is a process of private decisionmaking shaped primarily by
market forces, while in public employment it is a process of governmental decisionmaking
shaped ultimately by political forces.")
6. For instance, the 10 major steel companies and the United Steelworkers of America
agreed both during the 1974 and 1977 negotiating periods to send to interest arbitration
any issues that could not be resolved through negotiations. The interest arbitration agree-
ment in the steel industry is the Experimental Negotiating Agreement Between the
United Steelworkers of America and the Coordinating Committee Steel Companies (1974
8& 1977) (on file with Yale Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as ENA]. See p. 723 &
note 32 infra. For a discussion of the ENA, see Abel, Exploring Alternatives to the
Strike: Basic Steel's Experimental Negotiating Agreement, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Sept.
1973, at 39; Cushman, Current Experiments in Collective Bargaining, in PROCEEDINGS O
THE TWENTY-SIXTH ANNUAL WINTER MEL"ING, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS R sEARc- ASSocIA-
TION 129, 129-31 (G. Somers cd. 1974); Fischer, The Significance of tie Steel No-Strike
Arbitration Agreement, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY TWENTY-SIXTH ANNUAL
CONrERENCE Ox LAuOR 93 (E. Stein & S. Reiner eds. 1974); Morris, slpra note 1, at 498-
503.
In Aikens v. Abel, 373 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Pa. 1974), union members clallenged the
ENA on the grounds that union leadership failed to obtain membership approval of
the interest arbitration clause prior to its adoption. The court held tlat tile union
leadership was not legally required to obtain membership approval of tile ENA. It also
held that the leadership of the union did not act improperly in bargaining away the
right to strike in the succeeding negotiating period.
7. Massachusetts Nurses Ass'n, 225 N.L.R.B. No. 91, 92 L.R.R.M. 1478 (1976); Greens-
boro Printing Pressmen & Assistants' Union No. 319, 222 N.L.R.B. No. 144, 91 L.R.R.M.
1308 (1976); Coltmbus Printing Pressmen & Assistants' Union No. 252, 219 N.L.R.B. 268,
89 L.R.R.M. 1553 (1975).
8. Sections 8(a)(5), 8(b)(3), and 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29
U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (b)(3), (d) (1970), establish the duty of employers and unions to
bargain in good faith over "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment." NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970). The courts refer to subjects that fall
within this definition and therefore within the duty to bargain as "mandatory" subjects
of bargaining. The standards used to determine the mandatory or nonmandatory status
of bargaining subjects are discussed at pp. 720-23 infra.
The mandatory-nonmandatory distinction has been criticized for allowing the courts
and the NLRB rather than the parties to define tile scope of collective bargaining. See,
e.g., H. WNVLLINGTON, LAIOR AND TIll LEGAL PROCESS 63-90 (1968). But cf. Fibreboard Paper
Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 219 n.2 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (suggesting it
is too late to dispense with distinction regardless of its alleged shortcomings because "too
much law has been built" on it).
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tice for one party to bargain to impasse over the clause, i.e., to make its
inclusion a condition for entering into the collective bargaining agree-
ment despite the other party's objection.9
At stake in this controversy is the parties' freedom to contract"°-to
determine through the bargaining process whether to include an in-
terest arbitration clause in their agreement. Moreover, the non-
mandatory status of the interest arbitration clause will hinder imple-
mentation of this effective means for the maintenance of labor peace;
yet maintaining labor peace is one of the fundamental goals of national
labor policy." The practical consequences of the Board's decisions may
be far-reaching. Where a union or a management is unwilling to
absorb the economic and political costs of strikes or lockouts, it can-
not use its full bargaining strength in an attempt to include an in-
terest arbitration clause in the agreement. For example, an industry
may be subject to consumer stockpiling of goods as a hedge against
the possibility of a strike, with the consequent "roller-coaster" effect
on industry production and employment. 12 A concerned union or
management cannot insist to impasse that the strike possibility be
postponed through adoption of an interest arbitration clause. The
erosion of freedom of contract, the failure to promote labor peace, and
the more tangible industrial consequences flowing from the NLRB's
rulings argue for a thorough reconsideration of the Board's position.
This Note contends that the reasoning behind the NLRB's rulings
is misconceived: a properly circumscribed interest arbitration clause
satisfies traditional requirements for mandatory subject status. The
Note argues further that under certain circumstances the NLRB should
permit interest arbitrators to make the initial determination regarding
the mandatory or nonmandatory status of disputed bargaining issues.
9. See generally Comment, Impasse in Collective Bargaining, 44 TEx. L. REV. 769
(1966). In NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958), the Supreme
Court held it an unfair labor practice to argue to impasse on a nonmandatory subject of
bargaining, based on NLRA §§ 8(a)(5), 8(b)(3), and 8(d), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (b)(3), (d)
(1970). Arguing to impasse on a nonmandatory subject, i.e., a subject not included in the
statutory description, "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment," is
considered a refusal to bargain in good faith. 356 U.S. at 349.
10. For a discussion of governmental encroachments upon freedom of contract in
collective bargaining, see H. WELLINGTON, supra note 8, at 49-125.
11. See, e.g., Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB,'379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964) ("One of
the primary purposes of the [NLRA] is to promote the peaceful settlement of industrial
disputes by subjecting labor-management controversies to the mediatory influence of
negotiation."); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Na igation Co., 563 U.S. 574, 578
(1960) ("A major factor in achieving industrial peace is the inclusion of a provision for
arbitration of grievances in the collective bargaining agreement.")
12. See p. 723 & note 32 infra.
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I. The Interest Arbitration Clause as a Mandatory
Subject of Bargaining
The NLRB has ruled on three occasions that the interest arbitration
clause is a nonmandatory subject of bargaining.13 Its opinion in
Columbus Printing Pressmen & Assistants' Union No. 252 is the
most complete statement of its position.' 4 The parties in Columbus
Printing Pressmen had included an interest arbitration clause in their
agreements for over two decades. In 1970, however, management
resisted union efforts to include such a clause. The disputed issue was
referred to arbitration as provided by the existing interest arbitration
clause, and the arbitrator declared the disputed provision part of the
new agreement. In 1973 management again resisted, but this time com-
plained to the NLRB that the union had committed an unfair labor
practice by arguing to impasse on a nonmandatory subject of bargain-
ing. The NLRB upheld management's claim.
Three objections to the interest arbitration clause underlay the
Board's position. First, the clause was held not to fall within the
statutory description of mandatory bargaining subjects.1 5 Second, the
Board believed that the interest arbitration clause interfered with the
parties' statutory right to use economic force in collective bargain-
ing.' 6 Third, the clause, according to a concurring Member of the
13. Massachusetts Nurses Ass'n, 225 N.L.R.B. No. 91, 92 L.R.R.M. 1478 (1976); Greens-
boro Printing Pressmen & Assistants' Union No. 319, 222 N.L.R.B. No. 144, 91 L.R.R.M.
1308 (1976); Columbus Printing Pressmen & Assistants' Union No. 252, 219 N.L.R.B. 268,
89 L.R.R.M. 1553 (1975).
14. 219 N.L.R.B. 268, 89 L.R.R.M. 1553 (1975). The Board found its decision in
Columbus Printing Pressmen dispositive of the two cases decided subsequently, Mas-
sachusetts Nurses Ass'n, 225 N.L.R.B. No. 91, 92 L.R.R.M. 1478 (1976); and Greensboro
Printing Pressmen & Assistants' Union No. 319, 222 N.L.R.B. No. 144, 91 L.R.R.M 1308
(1976).
In Colunbus Printing Pressmen the Board adopted the opinion of the administrative
law judge holding the interest arbitration clause a nonmandatory subject of bargaining.
The administrative law judge relied upon the opinion of another administrative law
judge in Mechanical Contractors Ass'n, 202 N.L.R.B. 1, 5-16 (1973). There, the majority
of the Board did not adopt the judge's opinion because they felt the disputed practice
did not constitute interest arbitration. Id. at 2; 82 L.R.R.M. at 1439. See 22 W.YNE L.
REV. 965, 965-67 (1976).
15. 219 N.L.R.B. at 279-81, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1556-58.
16. There is a brief reference to this objection in the plurality opinion, id. at 280-81,
89 L.R.R.M. at 1557-58, and a more explicit reference in Chairman Murphy's dissent:
The principal ground for finding a violation appears to be that because the quid
pro quo for the interest arbitration clause is the waiver of the employees' right to
bring economic pressure against the Employer by strike action, and, because public
policy frowns upon any undue interference with the right to strike, necessarily the
interest arbitration clause itself is against public policy.
Id. at 273, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1561. On this point the plurality opinion relied upon the
similar reasoning of the administrative law judge in Mechanical Contractors Ass'n, 202
N.L.R.B. 1, 14-15 (1973).
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Board, threatened to substitute perpetual arbitral rule for the process
of collective bargaining, since neither party could unilaterally with-
draw from the agreement to arbitrate interest disputes.'- The final
two objections suggest that even if an interest arbitration clause fell
within the statutory description of mandatory subjects, it still could
not be considered mandatory because it offends a national labor policy
that strongly supports the concept of collective bargaining.
A. The Interest Arbitration Clause as a Condition of Employment:
A Statutory Interpretation
Mandatory subjects of bargaining are those within the National
Labor Relations Act's (NLRA) description, "wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment."' 8 In Allied Chemical Workers
Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,' 9 the Supreme Court held that
this language "includes only issues that settle an aspect of the relation-
ship between the employer and employees." 20 The NLRB concluded
in Columbus Printing Pressmen that the interest arbitration clause
is a nonmandatory subject of bargaining because it applies to disputes
over terms to be included in an agreement subsequent to the one in
which it exists; thus it is not a condition of employment during the
period of the existing agreement.21 To cast the NLRB holding in
terms of an embellishment of the Supreme Court's standard, the
17. The plurality opinion in Columbus Printing Pressmen mentions this objection,
but apparently does not rely upon it. 219 N.L.R.B. at 281 n.9, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1558 n.9.
In concurrence, however, Member Fanning adopts by reference his dissent in Mechanical
Contractors Ass'n, 202 N.L.R.B. 1, 3-5, 82 L.R.R.M. 1438, 1441-42 (1973), in which he
raised the issue. 219 N.L.R.B. at 270, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1559.
18. NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
19. 404 U.S. 157 (1971).
20. Id. at 178. The Supreme Court's language in Pittsburgh Plate Glass echoes the
Court's decision in NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). In
Borg-Warner, the Court declared a proposed contract provision requiring a ballot of
employees before a strike to be a nonmandatory subject of bargaining. The "ballot"
clause was distinguished from a "no-strike" clause (a mandatory subject) because the
latter "regulates relations between the employer and the employees" and the former
does not. Id. at 350. Compare, e.g., Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. NLRB, 476 F.2d
1079 (2d Cir. 1973) (group health insurance held mandatory subject) and Adams Potato
Chips, Inc. v. NLRB, 430 F.2d 90 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 975 (1971) (vaca-
tion benefits held mandatory subject) with NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner
Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958) (prestrike "ballot" clause held nonmandatory subject) and
NLRB v. Wonder State Mfg. Co., 344 F.2d 210 (8th Cir. 1965) (nonremunerative gifts
from employer held nonmandatory subject).
21. 219 N.L.R.B. at 279, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1556 ("The [interest] arbitration clause .. .
does not come within the classification of a mandatory subject of bargaining . . . . [I]t
injects into the negotiations for a current contract matter which does not concern itself
with the terms and conditions of employment of the employees during the period of
such contract.")
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Board found that the clause does not settle an aspect of the employ-
ment relationship during the term of the agreement in which it exists.
An examination of the NLRA reveals no basis for the Board's
limitation. Section 8(d) defines collective bargaining as, inter alia,
the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of
the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any ques-
tion arising thereunder.
22
This language merely prescribes the duty to bargain in good faith on
subjects relating to the employment relationship. It does not restrict
that duty to subjects affecting the relationship during the contract
period. Further, to read this language as imposing such a limitation
would be to divorce the statutory conception of collective bargaining
from industrial practice. The Board's view posits that rigid barriers
separate contract periods. Collective bargaining, however, is an on-
going process,2 3 despite the contractual concepts and terminology im-
posed on it by the federal labor laws. 24 The expiration and adoption
of collective bargaining agreements merely provide the parties with
periodic opportunities to redefine their relationship and should not
22. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
23. See Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Local 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, 45
U.S.L.W. 4251 (U.S. Mar. 7, 1977) (obligation to arbitrate disputes extends beyond
termination of contract containing grievance arbitration provision, even where issues in
dispute arise subsequent to termination); NLRB v. Laney & Duke Storage Warehouse
Co., 369 F.2d 859, 866 (5th Cir. 1966) (duty to bargain is continuing, so union may
legitimately bargain over wages and conditions of employment which affect employees
hired in future); J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 253 F.2d 149, 153 (7th Cir. 1958) (collective
bargaining is continuing process, so that union's right to data from management not
limited to pending wage negotiations).
24. In addition to their failure to take into account the dynamic nature of collective
bargaining, contractual concepts and terminology may be inadequate in other respects as
well. Professor Chamberlain, for example, argued that a difficulty "in the field of
industrial relations lies in the fact that we have sought to apply to collective bargaining
and its resulting collective agreement the same doctrine which pertains to individual
contract." Chamberlain, Collective Bargaining and the Concept of Contract, 48 COLUM.
L. RLV. 829, 834 (1948).
We are reproducing in our thinking an error of earlier years, by treating the
collectihe association of workers as a single person, just as we have treated the
corporation as a legal person. As persons they could be subsumed under the doctrine
of individual contract-but only by ignoring their most basic characteristic, their
collectih e nature.
Id. at 836. See Summers, Collective Agreements and the Law of Contracts, 78 YALE L.J.
525, 527 (1969) (legal rules governing commercial contracts cannot profitably be applied
to collectihe bargaining agreements although contract principles may be helpful); cf. Al.
FREEDLAND, Tne CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT 1 (1976) (although maintaining its legal
significance, contract of employment in Britain fails adequately to express realities of
contemporary employment relationship).
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be viewed as barriers, legal or otherwise, beyond which the parties
cannot look in determining the course of that relationship. For
example, terms of employment such as pensions and profit-sharing
retirement plans extend beyond the contract period. Indeed, such
provisions have been designated mandatory subjects,2 even though
they do not normally produce material benefits for employees during
the life of the agreement in which the terms exist.
20
Thus the interest arbitration clause should be considered a manda-
tory subject of bargaining if it settles an aspect of the employment
relationship, without regard to whether that aspect falls within the
tenure of the existing agreement. That the clause does settle an aspect
of the employment relationship seems clear. It stipulates the parties'
course of action if, during a subsequent period of negotiation, they
are unable to agree on one or more bargaining issues. In this respect
it is similar to the grievance arbitration clause, which is a mandatory
subject of bargaining.27 In finding the grievance arbitration clause
mandatory, courts apparently have been influenced by the "federal
policy of promoting industrial peace through a combination of no-
strike clauses and effective arbitration provisions." 28 This policy also
militates in favor of the interest arbitration clause. Under both clauses
the parties agree to arbitrate future disputes and to relinquish the
rights to strike and to lockout for a future period.2 9 The only distinc-
25. See Retail Clerks Union No. 1550 v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 828 (1964) (pensions held mandatory subject); NLRB v. Black-Clawson Co., 210
F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1954) (profit-sharing retirement plan held mandatory subject).
26. In her dissent in Colmbus Printing Pressmen, Chairman Murphy commented
that mandatory subjects of bargaining such as pensions are similar to the interest
arbitration clause, since they do not have an immediately measurable impact upon the
welfare of bargaining unit employees. 219 N.L.R.B. at 275, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1564.
The presence in the contract of terms embodying pension plans and profit-sharing re-
tirement plans represents a promise to pay financial benefits after the contract period. An
interest arbitration clause also represents a promise to confer benefits after the contract
period: to prevent the deleterious impact of strikes and lockouts on employment and
production.
Moreover, pensions and profit-sharing retirement plans cannot be distinguished from
the interest arbitration clause on the grounds that they positively affect employee
morale during the term of the existing agreement. The security gained from knowing
that the interest arbitration clause forecloses the possibility of disruption through strikes
and lockouts may also boost employee morale.
27. See, e.g., United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 150, 156 (D.C.
Cir. 1969); United States Gypsum Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 112, 28 L.R.R.M. 1015 (1951).
28. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 150, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
cf. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960) ("A
major factor in achieving industrial peace is the inclusion of a provision for arbitration
of grievances in the collective bargaining agreement.")
29. See Taylor, Effectuating the Labor Contract Through Arbitration, in TiuE PRO-
FESSION OF LABOR ARBITRATION, SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE FiRST SEVEN ANNUAL ,IELTINGS
OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 20, 20 (J. McKelvey ed. 1957) (defining
grievance arbitration clause as "an agreement to arbitrate future disputes, since the
rights to strike and to lock out are relinquished for a future period").
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tion is that the grievance arbitration clause provides for resolution of
disputes concerning interpretation of terms in the agreement in which
it exists, while the interest arbitration clause applies to disputes con-
cerning negotiation of terms in the succeeding agreement.3 0
Even if the Board were correct in holding that a mandatory subject
of bargaining must settle an aspect of the employment relationship
while the existing agreement is in force, the interest arbitration clause
could still qualify. An employer's business may be seriously affected
by consumer stockpiling of goods in anticipation of a strike. Such
stockpiling can lead to periods of intense work and overtime employ-
ment preceding expiration of a collective bargaining agreement, and
to employee layoffs subsequent to adoption of a new agreement. An
interest arbitration clause, by establishing the prospect of a production
schedule uninterrupted by strikes and lockouts, prevents consumer
stockpiling and the consequent fluctuation in employment levels.
Thus the interest arbitration clause settles an aspect of the employment
relationship while the existing agreement is in force. In the steel in-
dustry, adoption of an interest arbitration clause31 is credited with
ending the consumer practice of stockpiling steel during the year in
which the collective bargaining agreement was due to expire.3 2
30. Indeed, one vicw of grievance arbitration discounts even this distinction. This
view has it that grievances often arise over issues not covered by the agreement, perhaps
because the agreement represents an inconclusive meeting of minds. N. CHAMBERLAIN & J.
KUHN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 112 (2d ed. 1965); Katz, Minimizing Disputes Through the
Adjustment of Grievances, 12 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 249, 259 (1947). Nevertheless, these
grievances are arbitrated. Grievance arbitration from this vantage point is an extension
of collective bargaining and is quite similar to interest arbitration. The classic statement
of this view is found in Taylor, supra note 29, at 21, where the author argues that
grievance arbitration at times is tantamount to "agreement-making." But see Braden,
The Function of the Arbitrator in Labor-Management Disputes, 4 ARB. J. 35 (new series
1949).
31. See note 6 supra.
32. See An Experiment in Problem-Solving 6-7 (Pamphlet No. PR-226, United Steel-
workers of America, undated):
There can be no question that the intended goals of [the interest arbitration agree-
ment] were, in fact, reached. Since the steel consumers saw no chance of a halt in
steel operations, there was no need for them to stockpile. Without the stockpiling
and subsequent sell-off, there were no sharp gyrations in employment, either before
the settlement date, or for many months thereafter . . . . The employment stability
that was sought during the negotiating period was, in fact, achieved.
Prior to adoption of the interest arbitration agreement in the steel industry, stock-
piling was accomplished in part through purchases of foreign steel. For instance, as a
supplement to domestic production American consumers imported 18 million tons of
foreign steel in the negotiating year 1968. By 1970 imports had dropped to 13.4 million
tons. But in 1971, the next negotiating year, imports rose to an alltime high of 18.3
million tons. Id. at 8.
The stockpiling had led to an increase in orders for steel before the expiration of an
existing agreement and to a decrease in orders after the negotiation of a new agreement.
Employment levels in the steel industry consequently fluctuated both before and after
the adoption of new agreements. For example, in the three months following adoption
of agreements in 1965 and 1968, production-worker employment in the basic steel in-
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B. Interest Arbitration and the Role of Economic Force
Both Congress 33 and the courts3 4 have sought to protect the right of
unions and managements to use economic force during collective
bargaining. In NLRB v. Insurance Agents International Union,35 the
Supreme Court stated that "[t]he presence of economic weapons in
reserve, and their actual exercise on occasion by the parties, is part
and parcel of the system that the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts have
recognized." 36 Yet, by agreeing to arbitrate disputes arising during
negotiation of a subsequent agreement, the parties seemingly relin-
quish their right to resort to these economic weapons.
It has long been accepted that parties may agree to a no-strike clause,
which waives the right to use economic force during the contract
term.37 Indeed, courts have held such a no-strike clause to be a manda-
dustry dropped by approximately 14% and 17%, respectively. Id. at 5, charts I & 2
following p. 9 (quoting U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics). In .4971 the drop in employment
began to appear a month before the old agreement expired. Id. at 5. In the first month
following adoption of the new agreement, employment was down by approximately 18%.
Id. at 5-6, chart 3 following p. 9. (This source indicates that the 18% drop occurred one
month subsequent to the expiration of the old agreement, but the Wall Street Journal
indicates that expiration of the old agreement and adoption of the new one occurred
nearly simultaneously. Wall St. J., Aug. 2, 1971, at 3, col. I.)
But in 1974, after adoption of the interest arbitration clause, employment in steel
suffered no drastic fluctuations either before expiration of the old agreement or after
adoption of the new one. An Experiment in Problem-Solving, supra at 6-7, chart 4
following p. 9. By postponing the possibility of industrial disruption, the interest arbi-
tration clause apparently contributed to normalizing production and employment patterns
in the steel industry. Id.
Service industries would seem to be immune to practices such as stockpiling. But
mining and manufacturing industries producing nonperishable goods are susceptible to
stockpiling in anticipation of a strike. For example, prior to the 1974 negotiations in the
coal industry, it was reported that the soaring profits of coal producers were attributable
at least in part to the "near-panic buying by utilities and exporters scrambling for coal
in anticipation of the nationwide coal strike." N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1974, at 55, col. 1.
Such an industry could benefit from the ameliorative effect of the interest arbitration
clause.
33. See A. Cox, LAW AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POLIcY 4-19 (1960) (tracing congres-
sional support for right to strike, as well as qualifications of that support).
34. See, e.g., NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 287 (1972) ("Prevent-
ing industrial strife is an important aim of federal labor legislation, but Congress has not
chosen to make the bargaining freedom of employers and unions totally subordinate to
this goal. When a bargaining impasse is reached, strikes and lockouts may occur."); Air
Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. CAB, 502 F.2d 453, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
972 (1975) (national labor policy rests upon principle that parties are free to marshal
economic resources in resolution of labor disputes, consistent with rights and prohibitions
of labor statutes).
35. 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
36. Id. at 489. The Court in Insurance Agents held that a union's tactics designed to
exert economic pressure during negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement do not
constitute a refusal to bargain in good faith.
37. See, e.g., NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 325 (1974); Textile Workers v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957).
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tory subject of bargaining. 8 But the NLRB apparently believes that
an interest arbitration clause, waiving the right to use economic force
during a future negotiating period,"39 is distinguishable from the con-
ventional no-strike clause.4 0 For if the interest arbitration clause is
held a mandatory subject of bargaining, a party might reluctantly
agree to adopt the clause in order to avoid a strike or lockout during
the current negotiating period. With the conventional no-strike clause
already a mandatory subject, a reluctant party might find it necessary
to agree to forgo economic force both during and after the term of an
agreement.
The NLRB has misconceived the relationship between interest arbi-
tration and economic force. Interest arbitration merely coexists with,
rather than supplants, economic force in collective bargaining. The
basis of this coexistence is the distinction between actual and threat-
ened use of economic force.4 1 If effective bargaining required actual
use of economic force during negotiation of an agreement, the NLRB's
position would be well-founded, for interest arbitration is an alterna-
tive to strikes and lockouts. But effective bargaining in fact requires
only that the parties be able credibly to threaten the use of force.
The threat of force is sufficient because the collective bargaining
relationship is not coterminous with the agreement that temporarily
embodies it.42 Rather, the parties are likely to view themselves as
permanently ensconced within their bargaining relationship. Threat-
ened future use of economic force thus may have an influence on
current negotiations that approximates actual use. The present use of
economic force is inevitably a more immediate and therefore a more
imposing prospect. But a party threatening to use economic force in
a future negotiating period may compensate by varying the magnitude
of the threat as the occasion demands.
4
3
38. See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 213 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1954). In Local
174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962), the Supreme Court went even
further in support of no-strike provisions and found a no-strike clause implicit in an
agreement, even though the parties had not included one. The agreement did contain a
grievance arbitration provision.
39. In Aikens v. Abel, 373 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Pa. 1974), the court, faced with a
challenge by union members to the interest arbitration clause in the steel industry, held
that the right to use economic force during a subsequent negotiating period could be
waied by mutual agreement.
40. Columbus Printing Pressmen & Assistants' Union No. 252, 219 N.L.R.B. 268, 280-
81, 89 L.R.R.M. 1553, 1557-58 (1975). The opinion in Columbus Printing Pressmen relied
heavily upon the discussion of this issue in Mechanical Contractors Ass'n, 202 N.L.R.B.
1, 11-15 (1973).
41. This distinction is drawn by Stevens, supra note 1, at 75.
42. See pp. 721-22 & notes 23-26 supra.
43. For example, where an interest arbitration clause exists, employer intransigence on
a particular bargaining issue might cause a union to threaten a strike at the termination
of the succeeding agreement when it is no longer bound by the clause. The union may
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Nonetheless, it might be argued that only a severe escalation of the
threat could compensate for the inability to use force currently. The
argument would emphasize that parties are principally motivated by
the possibility of short-term advantage and are not intimidated by
threatened use of economic force at some point in the future. Yet this
position overlooks crucial restraints on the bargaining process.4"4 Since
a bargaining relationship is normally ongoing, professional negotiators
are generally hesitant to press bargaining advantages that may prove
ephemeral. They recognize that to do so could create expectations in
the minds of their constituents that such advantages will be main-
tained and perhaps improved upon in the future. Further, the oppos-
ing party may be more recalcitrant in future negotiations because of
past concessions. Subsequent agreements might therefore be more
difficult to negotiate. The parties' sensitivity to long-term considera-
tions is grounded in "the common need to preserve the continuity of
the bargaining relationship."'- With both parties seeking to preserve
this continuity, the impact of the threatened future use of force is
substantially enhanced.
46
C. Overcoming the Problem of Perpetual Arbitral Rule: The Self-
Terminating Interest Arbitration Clause
When an interest arbitration clause exists in the expiring collective
bargaining agreement and a dispute arises over whether to include a
escalate by threatening to strike a larger portion of the employer's operation for a
longer period of time. The union could also threaten obstructive tactics in the rcsolution
of disputes arising during the contract period. A similar range of options is open to
management. In short, the panoply of threats one party can invoke against another in
the context of collective bargaining is not limited to the simple decision to strike or
to lockout.
44. Flanders, Collective Bargaining: A Theoretical Analysis, 6 BRIr. J. INDUs. RLL. 1,
13-16 (1968).
45. Id. at 14.
46. Id. at 13-16. Stevens, supra note 1, at 75-76, adopts a similar argument:
To explore the implications of extended no-strike agreements, consider a series of
negotiations-NI, N2, and N3. The parties' standard procedure has been to
negotiate a no-strike agreement only during the term of each of the substantive
agreements. What about negotiating, along with the substantive terms during N1,
an agreement which precludes resort to strike during N2? .. .. The N2 no-strike
agreement itself becomes a bargaining lever for use during N1. Also, under tile x-
tended cease-fire, although a strike during N2 is precluded, the N2 negotiations are
not themselves free of strike pressure. This is the case because of the implications for
N3 of the N2 settlement. For example, if the company takes advantage of the no-
strike agreement to drive a hard bargain during N2, this will leave further distance
to move in order to avoid a strike during N3.
The potential impact of the threatened future use of economic force is illustrated by
current practice in collective bargaining. If, during the term of an agreement, one party
threatens to take advantage of another, the latter, assuming legal action is inappropriate,
will likely respond by threatening use of economic force at the expiration of the agree-
ment. That threat may constrain the party against whom the threat is made, even
though the immediate use of economic force is out of the question.
726
Vol. 86: 715, 1977
Interest Arbitration and the NLRB
similar clause in the succeeding agreement, an arbitrator empowered
by the existing clause to decide the issue can override the objection of
one of the parties and renew the clause.47 In this situation, the clause
becomes a less voluntary form of dispute resolution, in the sense that
its presence can no longer be attributed directly to good faith bargain-
ing. Indeed, the arbitrator may retain the clause because he interprets
the efforts to remove it as adverse commentary on his performance. 48
Moreover, the chance that the clause may be perpetuated through
successive arbitration awards substantially dilutes the threat of future
use of economic force.
An interest arbitration clause could thus ensnare the parties in a
compulsory system of dispute resolution and negate the factor of
economic force in the collective bargaining equation. Both results do
violence to the statutory conception of collective bargaining. 49 To
hold the clause a mandatory subject of bargaining would allow one
party to use economic force in insisting upon a course that could lead
to these results. Such a holding would be inconsistent with the legisla-
tive and judicial mandate to protect the collective bargaining process5O
Adoption of a "self-terminating" interest arbitration clause, one
which excluded from arbitration the issue of incorporating a new
interest arbitration clause in the succeeding agreement,51 would avoid
this problem. A self-terminating clause would be a more voluntary
form of dispute settlement, since its inclusion would be directly at-
tributable to a new bargain every negotiating period. Further, it
preserves for the parties a viable threat of economic force, since im-
plementation of the threat is postponed by only one contract period
subsequent to the time of the clause's operation.52 Indeed, since one
issue-whether to include the clause in the next agreement-is exempt
from arbitration, the parties could conceivably use economic force in
47. See, e.g., Columbus Printing Pressmen & Assistants' Union No. 252, 219 N.L.R.B.
268, 276, 89 L.R.R.M. 1553, 1554 (1975).
48. See Sticber, supra note 3, at 94.
49. See p. 724 & notes 33-36 supra.
50. The Supreme Court has in the past had occasion to restrict collective bargaining
on subjects that threaten the collective bargaining process. See NLRB v. Magnavox Co.,
415 U.S. 322, 324-26 (1974) (union cannot bargain away employees' right to choose bar-
gaining representative by agreeing to ban on union organizational activity); NLRB v.
Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 350 (1958) ("ballot" clause calling for
prestrike secret vote of employees not mandatory subject because it modifies collective
bargaining system proiided for in statute by weakening independence of union).
51. See ENA, supra note 6, § H (1977) ("This agreement shall . . . terminate August
1, 1977, except to the extent that its continuation beyond that date is deemed necessary
by the parties to achieve the objectives of this Agreement.") The parties' interest arbi-
tration agreement effective during the 1974 negotiations had a similar provision. See id.
(1974).
52. While the lengths of contract periods vary, they are usually two or three Years.
See Stieber, 3upra note 3, at 79-80.
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the period of negotiation governed by the interest arbitration clause
to support their positions on the interest arbitration issue. 3 The self-
terminating clause therefore ought to be classified a mandatory subject
of bargaining.
II. NLRB Deference to Interest Arbitration
The jurisdiction of the interest arbitrator and the NLRB may over-
lap where one party claims that the disputed issue involves an unfair
labor practice-namely, arguing to impasse on a nonmandatory subject
of bargaining. It is settled that nothing in the arbitration agreement
between the parties may supplant the NLRB's jurisdiction over un-
fair labor practices.54 Yet, one question raised by Columbus Printing
Pressmen is whether the NLRB should permit interest arbitrators to
make the initial determination regarding the mandatory or non-
mandatory status of the disputed issue, while retaining the right to
review the arbitrator's decision.
An interest arbitration clause could be designed to bring disputed
issues to arbitration prior to impasse and thus block the NLRB's entry
into the dispute. Such a clause might stipulate a negotiating period
that terminates before expiration of the existing contract and provide
that issues unresolved in that period should be referred to arbitration.
If, however, the standard for invoking arbitration is simply the
parties' failure to resolve the issue through negotiations, NLRB in-
volvement could be predicated upon a complaint that one party has
argued to impasse over a nonmandatory subject. In Columbus Printing
Pressmen, for instance, management complained to the NLRB that
the union had negotiated to impasse on the new interest arbitration
clause, which management believed to be a nonmandatory subject.
The union responded that, having argued to impasse, the parties were
bound by contract to refer the disputed issue to the interest arbitrator.
By the union's reasoning, the original determination of whether the
disputed issue was a mandatory subject could have been made by the
interest arbitrator rather than the NLRB. Since the disputed issue was
not referred to arbitration by mutual consent, the arbitrator, prior to
making his substantive award, would have had to establish his juris-
diction under the contract. First, he would have had to determine
53. While it is thus true that the presence of a self-terminating interest arbitration
clause would not preclude strikes and lockouts, it is unlikely that the parties would
choose to strike or to lockout over inclusion of the new clause in the next agreement if
all other issues are settled.
54. NLRA § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970).
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whether the dispute, in the words of the interest arbitration clause in
Columbus Printing Pressmen, "[could] be settled by negotiations.".55
Second, he would have had to determine whether the issue before him
was mandatory. Only if he found it mandatory could he properly have
assumed jurisdiction, because no party can legally bargain a nonmanda-
tory subject to impasse.56 As the NLRB indicated in Columbus Print-
ing Pressmen, it will not hesitate to interfere with the arbitrator's
jurisdiction under the contract in cases involving an alleged unfair
labor practice.
The NLRB in Columbus Printing Pressmen refused to permit the
arbitrator to make the initial determination because the Board con-
sidered the mandatory subject issue one of statutory rather than con-
tractual interpretationY7 Arbitrators can decide only disputes that
involve contractual questions.5 8 The Board failed to perceive, however,
that one of the contractual questions may be whether a contractual
question exists: if the disputed issue involves an unfair labor practice,
it is properly within the Board's jurisdiction and no further con-
tractual issues are involved. The determination of whether a disputed
issue is mandatory or nonmandatory may be contractual in this sense.
Therefore, where the status of a proposed subject of bargaining is
unclear, the Board should defer to the interest arbitrator who, as a
prelude to deciding the interest dispute, must determine whether the
disputed issue is mandatory, permissibly argued to impasse, and thus
properly referred to arbitration under the contract. The Board would,
of course, retain the right to review the arbitrator's statutory inter-
pretation.
An occasion for NLRB deference to interest arbitration was passed
over in Columbus Printing Pressmen. The Board's analysis simply
ignored the contractual component of the dispute, which would have
justified granting the initial determination to the interest arbitrator.
Precedent for this deference to interest arbitration is found in the
55. Columbus Printing Pressmen & Assistants' Union No. 252, 219 N.L.R.B. 268, 279
(1975) (quoting interest arbitration clause that controlled disputed negotiating issues
between employer and union in that case).
56. An arbitrator might settle the dispute between the parties without establishing
that the issue is a mandatory subject of bargaining. In this event the NLRB, upon
further consideration of the complaint subsequent to the arbitrator's award, would have
to determine whether the subject was indeed mandatory, properly argued to impasse, and
within the arbitrator's jurisdiction. Thus an arbitrator who is not attentive to the
mandatory or nonmandatory status of the issue upon which he grants an award risks
having his judgment overturned by the NLRB on review.
57. 219 N.L.R.B.-at 270, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1556.
58. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 34, 53-54 (1974) (arbitrator has
authority to resolve only questions of contractual rights, regardless of whether con-
tractual rights are similar to or duplicative of statutory rights).
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NLRB's willingness to defer to grievance arbitration when a complaint
alleges violations both of the contract and of the statute. 50 Under this
doctrine the NLRB can postpone consideration of the unfair labor
practice complaint until after the arbitrator's award. At that time the
Board can determine whether the award conforms to the requirements
of the NLRA.60 The doctrine relies upon the arbitrators' expertise to
decide issues of contractual interpretation that overlap statutory issues.
That same arbitral expertise can profitably be applied to the complex
question whether a bargaining subject "settle[s] an aspect of the
[parties'] relationship." 61
Reserving the right to review statutory judgments of interest arbi-
trators would permit the Board to overrule arbitral decisions when
appropriate. Yet the burden of decisionmaking and factfinding would
fall upon private arbitrators, thereby conserving the resources of the
59. See Collyer Insulated Wire, A Gulf & Western Sys. Co., 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 77
L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971). Collyer builds upon the Board's doctrine of postaward deference
under which the Board, when handling a complaint for the first time after an award has
already been granted, reviews the arbitrator's award in light of certain standards. See
Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 36 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1955). A detailed examination of
the NLRB's deference to grievance arbitration doctrine can be found in Murphy &
Sterlacci, A Review of the National Labor Relations Board's Deferral Policy, 42 FORDHAMi
L. REv. 291 (1973). The NLRB's deference policy has been the subject of widespread
debate. Compare, e.g., Getman, Collyer Insulated Wire: A Case of Misplaced Modesty, 49
IND. L.J. 57 (1973) and Getman, Can Collyer and Gardner-Denver Co-Exist?, id. at 285
with, e.g., Schatzki, A Response to Professor Getman, id. at 76 and Zimmer, A Little Bit
More on Collyer Insulated Wire, id. at 80.
The NLRB recently has decided that its willingness to defer to grievance arbitration
extends only to alleged unfair labor practices involving unlawful failures to bargain,
Roy Robinson, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. No. 103, 94 L.R.R.M. 1474 (1977), and not to alleged
unfair labor practices involving unlawful interference with workers' organibational
rights, General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. No. 102, 94 L.R.R.M. 1483 (1977). See
Wall St. J., Mar. 21, 1977, at 2, col. 3. Since deference to interest arbitration can only
arise in situations in which there is an alleged failure to bargain in good faith, the
arguments advanced here are not affected by the NLRB's recent limitation of the
Collyer doctrine.
60. Concomitant with the NLRB's jurisdiction over unfair labor practices granted by
NLRA § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970), is the authority to overrule arbitral decisions
that reach an incorrect conclusion on the unfair labor practice aspect of the case. See
Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 272 (1964).
Under the doctrine of preaward deference to grievance arbitration, see note 59 supra,
the NLRB will act further upon a complaint if it is established that
(a) the dispute has not, with reasonable promptness after the issuance of [the
decision to defer], either been resolved by amicable settlement in the grievance
procedure or submitted promptly to arbitration, or (b) the grievance or arbitration
procedures have not been fair and regular or have reached a result which is repugnant
to the Act.
Collyer Insulated Wire, A Gulf & Western Sys. Co., 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 843, 77 L.R.R.M.
1931, 1938 (1971).
61. Allied Chem. Workers Local I v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 178
(1971).
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NLRB. Since such a course also would respect the parties' designated
method of dispute resolution and thus honor their freedom to contract,
it is preferable to a prearbitration determination by the NLRB.
III. Four Paradigm Cases
It is appropriate to review the arguments concerning negotiation
and operation of the interest arbitration clause. Where the clause
requires that a subject be argued to impasse before arbitration, a party
can attempt to avoid arbitration by asking the NLRB to declare a
disputed bargaining subject nonmandatory. Such a determination
would bar the other party from arguing to impasse on the particular
subject and from referring that subject to interest arbitration. But
that other party may seek to have the interest arbitrator rather than the
NLRB make the original determination whether the subject is manda-
tory or nonmandatory. These moves by the parties can arise in a num-
ber of factual circumstances. Four paradigm cases will be presented to
indicate how the arguments of this Note might apply in these different
situations.
Paradigm Case A: There is an interest arbitration clause (not neces-
sarily self-terminating) in the expiring agreement, and one party
insists to impasse upon an issue other than inclusion of an interest
arbitration clause in the succeeding agreement. If the issue is manda-
tory, it can be arbitrated. If it is nonmandatory, the party insisting to
impasse has committed an unfair labor practice. If it is unclear
whether the issue is mandatory or nonmandatory, the NLRB ought to
defer to interest arbitration but retain the right to review the arbi-
trator's award.
Paradigm Case B: There is no interest arbitration clause in the
expiring agreement, but one party insists to impasse that such a clause
should be included in the succeeding agreement. If the disputed in-
terest arbitration clause is self-terminating, it should be regarded as a
mandatory subject of bargaining. The parties can decide, using eco-
nomic force if necessary, whether to include the clause in the next
agreement. If the clause is not self-terminating, it should be regarded
as nonmandatory, since it cannot overcome the problem of perpetual
arbitral rule. The party insisting to impasse has committed an unfair
labor practice.
Paradigm Case C: There is an interest arbitration clause (not self-
terminating) in the expiring agreement, and one party insists to im-
passe that another interest arbitration clause should be included in
the succeeding agreement. If the clause in dispute is self-terminating,
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the issue can be arbitrated. 2 If it is not self-terminating and thus is
nonmandatory, the party arguing to impasse has committed an unfair
labor practice.
Paradigm Case D: There is a self-terminating interest arbitration
clause in the expiring agreement, and one party insists to impasse that
another interest arbitration clause should be included in the succeed-
ing agreement. If the clause in dispute is self-terminating, it can be
argued to impasse. But since the existing clause is also self-terminating,
arbitration of the disputed issue is precluded, except by mutual agree-
ment on an ad hoc basis.0 3 The parties must then decide, using eco-
nomic force if necessary, whether to retain the clause. If the clause in
dispute is not self-terminating, the party insisting to impasse on the
issue commits an unfair labor practice.
62. Arbitrating the issue admittedly permits the existing, nonterminating clause to
control the decision to include the new clause. But consistency in treatment of the
disputed self-terminating clause as a mandatory subject of bargaining demands that it be
allowed to go to impasse and hence on to arbitration. The parties may still threaten
future use of economic force in their negotiations.
63. See Stevens, supra note 1, at 69-70.
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